the Repugnant Conclusion TORBJORN TANNSJO Stockholm University I. INTRODUCTION Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that 'total' utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic utilitarianism, lead to the conclusion that, to each population of quite happy persons there corresponds a more

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1 From the point of view of hedonistic utilitarianism, the repugnant conclusion should really be stated in terms of sentient beings, not in terms of people. It is quite possible, from the point of view of hedonistic utilitarianism, that we should prefer a world with many sentient non-human animals who lead lives just worth living to a world with very happy, though not so many, people.

14(3): 339–359. Temkin, Larry S. 2012. Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals  11 Sep 2016 However, some philosophers think we should accept the Repugnant Conclusion. Tännsjö (2002) argues that when we picture a “life barely  however, accept the Repugnant Conclusion, and offer a justification for it ( Tännsjö 2004).

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کال: 2005. ژبه: english. فایل:  The Repugnant Conclusion Essays on Population Ethics (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy) द्वारा Jesper Ryberg , Torbjörn Tännsjö , Torbjc6rn  En aktuell introduktion finns i The Repugnant Conclusion, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy frfattad av Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg och Torbjrn Tnnsj  the repugnant conclusion follows from any plausible moral principle, when applied to problems of population ethics. This means that, if a moral principle does not imply the repugnant conclusion, we must suspect that there is something seriously wrong with it. These argu-ments are not new, they are already present in the literature, but, The suggestions in the literature on how to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion can roughly be divided into eight categories: (1) introducing new ways of aggregating welfare into a measure of value; (2) questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare; (3) counting welfare differently depending on temporal or modal features; (4) revising the notion of a life worth living; (5) rejecting transitivity; (6) appeal to other values; (7) accepting the impossibility of a satisfactory population 1 From the point of view of hedonistic utilitarianism, the repugnant conclusion should really be stated in terms of sentient beings, not in terms of people. It is quite possible, from the point of view of hedonistic utilitarianism, that we should prefer a world with many sentient non-human animals who lead lives just worth living to a world with very happy, though not so many, people. O N THE REPUGNANCE OF THE REPUGNANT CONCLUSION 129 ments about the conclusion and justify why Tannsjo needs another argu- ment.

2015-08-26 · The piece was related to a philosophical idea known as the "repugnant conclusion" — basically, that there's a moral obligation to maximize the human population's size because more humans means

Parfit's "Reasons and Persons," part 42. The Stockholms universitet © Stockholms universitet, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Växel telefon: 08-16 20 00 . Om webbplatsen och cookies; Kontakt; Öppettider; Om webbplatsen The mere addition paradox, also known as the repugnant conclusion, is a problem in ethics, identified by Derek Parfit and discussed in his book Reasons and  Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Repugnant Conclusion" by Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn Tännsjö.

Put differently, he embraces what philosophers call the “repugnant conclusion”: the idea that adding more humans with good lives is always valuable, and so we should aim for the biggest population

The conclusion, that, for any world of people living very good lives, there is another, better, world of far more people living far worse lives, struck Parfit as deeply unintuitive, which drove him to label it repugnant. 1 In Derek Parfit’s original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is stated as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984).

Därför borde han bli vegetarian. Anledningen till detta är en artikel, "Why we ought to accept the repugnant conclusion",  Tännsjö är sedan 2002 Kristian Claëson-professor i praktisk filosofi vid Stockholms universitet. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004); The Repugnant Conclusion.
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Tannsjo repugnant conclusion

Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Köp The Repugnant Conclusion av Jesper Ryberg, Torbjoern Tannsjoe på Bokus.com. Pris: 1439 kr. E-bok, 2007.

2015-08-27 · Nobody is going to change their actions based on Tannsjo’s philosophy in the article.
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Feb 21, 2020 By Torbjorn Tannsjo; Abstract: Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that ‘ total’ utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic 

Total Utilitarianism implies the Repugnant Conclusion, which says that, for every Torbjörn Tännsjö offers a related account of how large numbers distort. 5 Tyler Cowen “Resolving the Repugnant Conclusion” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, ed. by Torbjorn Tannsjo and Jesper Ryberg  Keywords Repugnant conclusion 4 Wellbeing 4 Population ethics.